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# THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

## VALUE AND WORTH<sup>1</sup>

THE purpose of this article is to seek common ground on which two opposed schools of value-philosophy may meet. One school, represented recently by Perry, Prall, and Pepper, finds the definition of intrinsic value in the affective-volitional relation of interest. These writers conceive value to have a psychological basis in feeling and to designate relations between an individual and objects or acts liked or disliked. The other school, defended ably in America by Urban, finds value asserted in a unique type of judgment, and defines it as a category of being. I shall not discuss a third view, presented by Moore and Russell, that value is a quality, for I agree with Urban's position that this view is encumbered with insuperable difficulties. Incidentally, in the course of the article, I shall reply to Mr. Urban's generous review of my book.<sup>2</sup>

### I

The exponents of a relational value-theory maintain that value defined as a relation of interest is a sufficient description of value wherever it occurs. My first task will be to consider Mr. Urban's objections to the relational theory. I shall not, however, be concerned to defend Sheldon's "ontological definition" of value<sup>3</sup> as "the fulfilment of any tendency whatsoever." Here I accept Mr. Urban's criticism. I shall hope to show, however, what is the true bearing of the latter's criticism of the definition that is psychological and relational.

Mr. Urban believes that a relational definition of value is circu-

<sup>1</sup> The articles most frequently cited in this paper are those by Urban, this JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, pp. 449-465, 673-687; Vol. XIV, pp. 309-327; Vol. XV, pp. 393-405. I also cite, from the same JOURNAL, those by Perry, Vol. XI, pp. 141-162, and Fisher, Vol. XIV, pp. 570-582. Also, the monograph by Prall, *A Study in the Theory of Value*, Univ. of Cal. Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1921, and my book, *Values, Immediate and Contributory, and Their Interrelation*, New York Univ. Press, 1920.

<sup>2</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, pp. 53-55.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, pp. 453-455.

lar in character. What he means, I think, is that this attempt at definition leaves out an essential (to Mr. Urban *the* essential) mark of value. For he says<sup>4</sup> that "the denial that value can ultimately be defined as a relation does not mean that relational definitions are not useful." It is of great importance, therefore, to discover just what is omitted in a relational definition. Mr. Urban's criticisms<sup>5</sup> will point the way.

1. "Why, it may well be asked, should fulfilment of interest be a good? Why should pleasure confer a value? In all such definitions valuableness is already assumed—as an intrinsic quality of pleasure or of fulfilment, as the case may be." The sequel will show that I recognize that all included under the word value can not be defined as affective-volitional relations of interest. But it is true that one class of values, sometimes spoken of as *immediate*, can be defined adequately in such terms. I may like or dislike given objects or acts apart from any reflection. A bright color or a warm breeze may arouse in me a thrill of pleasure. To defend the application of the term value to such experiences, it is necessary only to indicate that it has a clear meaning when so used. Now when I speak of my likings and dislikings as having to do with value, I use the term to designate relations between a feeling individual and certain objects or acts. Value is not assumed to be "an intrinsic quality of pleasure," for the relations are between a pleased or displeased individual and liked or disliked objects or acts. "Interest" may be used in almost the same meaning, although "interest" frequently emphasizes the first term and "value" the second term of the same relation.

2. So far we have avoided the circularity which Mr. Urban thinks to beset a relational definition of all value. He tells us, however, that the circularity appears in another way. "The value of an object consists, it is said, in its satisfaction of desire, or more broadly, fulfilment of interest. But it is always possible to raise further questions which show conclusively that the value concept is already presupposed. Is the interest itself worthy of being satisfied? Is the object worthy of being of interest? In other words, the fact of intrinsic value requires us to find the essence of value in something other than this type of relation."

To defend the adequacy of a relational definition of immediate values, I may point out that such a definition is adequate because the questions raised by Mr. Urban are not a part of the experience. They need not be answered because they are not asked. My liking for a hot bath may have no reflective basis. Reflection might con-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 455, footnote.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 453.

vince me that the worth of a hot bath, at the time it was taken, was entirely negative. Surely we are not compelled to analyze our feelings in order to have them, and I can see no objection to calling the relations that come into being when things are liked or disliked, relations of immediate value.

It is quite another thing, however, to maintain that all that passes under the name of value may be defined in terms of affective-volitional relations. The usual criticism of the position that judgment plays an essential part in determining some values is to the effect that, although relations of interest may be modified by judgment, such judgment does not alter the essential nature of value which is still to be described in terms of interest. It is said that although I may begin by liking jazz and end by liking Brahms, value first and last is my interest in the one or the other. As Mr. Prall says,<sup>6</sup> "Judgment, while it may be instrumental in our coming to the point of assuming the attitude of liking toward one thing rather than another, never itself constitutes that attitude. The liking is all we have. We may be able to inquire why we like; but when we do thus inquire, we only analyze our liking into its respective parts or else show that one judgment of value implies the existence of another value than the one judged."

The nature of these contrasting points of view is best brought out when we ask how each is related to conscious activity. On the one hand, those who define all value in affective-volitional terms assert that the valuing individual is related to the objects or acts valued through feeling. On the other hand, other writers maintain that this type of definition leaves out the essential element of value, and they find this essential element in judgment. Nevertheless, those who hold this second view consider that feeling plays a part in the value-experience, so that it may be said that they describe the individual as both knowing and feeling in the experience of value. The first view is that of Perry and Prall; the second is held by writers of such different viewpoints as Dewey, Urban, Rickert, and Windelband. The latter writers have no psychological scruple in thus blending two aspects of consciousness, for they believe that the value-experience partakes of the character of both. I can not agree with this viewpoint for reasons which I shall cite below. My suggested solution of the problem will lie in the direction of maintaining that there are two broad types of values, one of which may be defined adequately as affective-volitional relations of interest, the other as worth which lies wholly within the realm of cognition. •

<sup>6</sup> Prall, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

## II

Mr. Urban feels that the affective-volitional definition leaves out the element of the *worth* of the feeling. Three possible viewpoints may be taken as to the position that worth occupies in conscious experience. (1) Worth may still lie within feeling when it is not determined wholly by feeling-relations. In other words, there may be some aspect of being, independent of the individual, which is of the nature of feeling, or at least near enough like feeling to be felt. To describe the relation of the valuing individual to such an "over-individual" worth-determinant, we should have to invent a term in the language of feeling to correspond with "apprehension" in the language of cognition. (2) Worth may be apprehended in the value-judgment which is the cognitive aspect of a whole experience of value in which cognition and feeling are blended. (3) Worth may be cognized only, and this worth-experience may be quite distinct from the feeling-relation of value between the individual who has the worth-experience and the object esteemed. The desirability of making a distinction between value and worth was first suggested to me in a letter from Miss Mary Case. Mr. Pepper's paper, "Primitive and Standard Value," recently read before the American Philosophical Association (1922), also led me to think of the implications of such a distinction.

I shall first consider the position that worth is in some way experienced through feeling. To describe this view adequately requires delicate handling. It is substantially that of Mr. Fisher, although I am not always clear as to his full meaning. Both he and Mr. Urban believe that value (Urban) or an object's value (Fisher) is apprehended in the value-judgment. But Mr. Fisher denies<sup>7</sup> that value itself is apprehended by the cognitive aspect of consciousness, although he holds that the complex "value-of-an-object" may thus be apprehended. I think that he means that a cognitive element enters our experience of value when we attribute worth to a particular object. This judgment of worth of an object is to be distinguished from worth itself which is "apprehended" through feeling. I can not help feeling that much remains unsaid by Mr. Fisher regarding the relation of the worth apprehended by feeling to the worth attributed to objects in the value-judgment. But I am not concerned here with enlarging on this question; the more fundamental question is whether worth may lie wholly within the sphere of feeling.

Mr. Fisher believes that we are unable to have knowledge of worth because worth is apprehended through some form of feeling.

<sup>7</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, p. 578.

He accepts, therefore, one horn of Perry's dilemma<sup>8</sup> ("The attitude of interest either constitutes values or it cognizes them"), and very logically denies that worth can be cognized at all. Knowledge *about* worth we may have, as we have knowledge about feeling, but we can no more cognize worth itself than we can inspect feeling through a microscope. I can not but feel that Urban impales Fisher on the wrong horn of the dilemma. Because he fails to see the importance of Fisher's distinction between value and an object's value, and because Fisher uses the term "apprehension" of worth and speaks as if feeling "merely furnishes the requisite sensibility" for such apprehension, Urban takes it for granted that he believes that worth may be cognized. This misapprehension arises partly through lack of a proper nomenclature, and partly through the lack of sufficient explanation by Fisher as to how objects *get* a value that lies within the realm of feeling. On the other hand, if he holds that worth is apprehended by feeling, he can suitably deny that worth itself can be cognized.

What is the bearing of a theory that worth is apprehended by feeling? The answer to this question would be contained in a discipline concerned with feeling much as epistemology is concerned with cognition. Is there objective worth which is affirmed (for want of a better term) by feeling, and which is an attribute (not a quality) of the objects of certain feeling-relations, but which lies outside that portion of given experience which is open to cognition? Empirical evidence for such a theory might be sought among primitive esthetic satisfactions produced by colors, harmonies, *etc.*, if some of these might be found to be without adequate psycho-physical explanation. In other words, it might be proved that we face a kind of brute reality in the worth-experience which can be explained only on the assumption that there is a category of feeling within the realm of being that is just as unalterable as the reality underlying the objects of cognition.

If such a theory were proved a fact, beauty would be shown to be independent of its apprehension; it would transcend relations of interest; and I doubt the wisdom of applying the term "value" to it at all. The evidence bearing on the theory is of such great complexity that after several years of reflection I am yet unable to form an opinion. I should welcome light from Mr. Fisher. If, however, it should be proved that worth of a certain kind is apprehended through feeling, such worth would be entirely distinct from the cognitive worth that I am about to discuss.

Having considered Mr. Fisher's position, I now turn to the

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, p. 152.

second and third possible standpoints regarding attribution of worth. Worth, as Mr. Urban thinks, may be attributed to an object in a value-judgment, the whole experience being of both a cognitive and an affective character. Mr. Urban's treatment of the value-judgment leaves no room for doubt that this is the meaning intended. He claims that we *know* value by affirmation in judgment,<sup>9</sup> and also that in making a value-judgment we are governed by an *a priori* law which works in us as "*an essential form of interest and volition as such.*"<sup>10</sup> I am not at the moment concerned with his theory that value is a category of reality apart from our experience, but solely with the one point that whenever we experience value, we are said to do so through both cognition and feeling. An experience of worth, under this view, must be referred to conscious activity as a whole if it is to be given a psychological description.

Against this view, I hold that value and worth, when analyzed, prove to be distinct, and that the term "intrinsic worth" has been applied ambiguously to designate now the one, now the other. First, I shall give instances of this confusion; secondly, I shall proceed to develop the view that the two types of intrinsic worth have distinct psychological bases, a task that will involve a criticism of Mr. Urban's theory of value-judgments.

1. I find a common assumption underlying the radically different views of Perry, Urban, Prall, and Dewey. It is that the intrinsic values defined as affective-volitional relations of interest are the same sort of entities as the intrinsic values which appear when we ask questions as to whether the worths are justified. Perry analyzes the complex state of mind when one judges a value into judgments of fact plus feeling for the object judged.<sup>11</sup> This feeling, for him, constitutes the value. Perry's position, therefore, is that intrinsic value, whether it be reflective or immediate, is equally constituted by feeling for an object, *i.e.*, that intrinsic value is always affective-volitional.

Prall<sup>12</sup> has shown recently in a forceful way that a judgment of contributory value such as "The pen is good for writing" implies the intrinsic worths of the "higher values" of truth, goodness, and contemplation. But Mr. Prall's thesis is that of "the identical nature of value as it appears in all cases of valuing."<sup>13</sup> Prall and Perry agree that value is constituted by interest, and that judgments of value do not affect the basic nature of value itself or bring

<sup>9</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 463.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 677.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XI, pp. 161-162.

<sup>12</sup> Prall, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254.

to light any new class of values. Urban, as we have seen, assumes the identity of the value defined as relational with the worth that appears after questions are asked as to its justification. Furthermore, in his later theory of value, he attempts to identify in kind all cases of intrinsic value by claiming that value is apprehended in a special kind of judgment, while maintaining at the same time that value is "*an essential form of interest and volition as such.*"<sup>14</sup> Finally, Dewey,<sup>15</sup> while recognizing the distinctness of many classes of values, speaks of certain judgments plus subsequent acts bringing into existence new intrinsic values. He thus regards affective-volitional values as of the same nature as the new intrinsic values which appear in consequence of judgment, in so far as *interest* is concerned. The new values differ, of course, in their cognitional aspect. Dewey and Urban, therefore, blend feeling and cognition in their descriptions of the values of appreciation in different ways. They make feeling an essential element of the worths affirmed in value-judgments, and neither of them would agree that the intrinsic worth affirmed in judgment does not contain the same element of feeling that creates simple, immediate values.

I submit that each of these writers fails adequately to analyze intrinsic value. I believe that much diversity of opinion will disappear when it is recognized that this term has been applied indiscriminately to value and worth. Although Miss Case first suggested the desirability of the distinction, I can not say, of course, that either she or Mr. Pepper, who recalled it to mind, would accept my development of it.

2. Let me begin with a word of caution. I do not assert that feeling and cognition may be separated in existence. Elsewhere<sup>16</sup> I have amplified this statement. While describing conscious activity as related to environment in two ways, I have not departed from the accepted psychological fact that feeling and cognition never occur in isolation. I do claim, however, that the affective and cognitive elements are always distinct upon introspective analysis, and that we can say of no conscious state that it contains a blend of feeling and cognition that defies analysis into two distinct aspects.<sup>17</sup> The purpose of this article is to prove that intrinsic value never properly designates the relation of objects to both aspects of conscious activity at once, but that there are two distinct types of in-

<sup>14</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 677.

<sup>15</sup> In a paper now in press.

<sup>16</sup> "The Coördinate Character of Feeling and Cognition," this JOURNAL, Vol. XVIII, pp. 288-295.

<sup>17</sup> *Values, Immediate and Contributory, and Their Interrelation*, pp. 94-104.



trinsic worth, concerned with the relation of objects to feeling and cognition, respectively.

(1) *Interest and Worth*.—Consideration of an objection to the distinction between immediate value and cognitive worth may serve as our starting-point. Perry and Prall claim that however modified our ascription of worth may become in consequence of judgment, the constitutive factor of both immediate value and cognitive worth always remains the element of *interest*. My enjoyment of a Bach fugue, however increased by study of its counterpoint, must in the end be referred to my liking for it, and this enjoyment is of the same nature as that which I experience when I taste a savory morsel. I reply that this statement, if adduced as an argument for the identity of the factor that constitutes immediate value with that which constitutes intrinsic worth, is a *non sequitur*. Since feeling is never divorced from cognition in conscious experience, it goes without saying that there are affective value-relations present in every moment of conscious activity. This fact, however, does not take into account the *additional* element of worth that may appear upon the reflection. Perry and Prall uncritically identify affective interest with interest that is wholly cognitive. To separate the two kinds of interest, it is only necessary to reflect that immediate value may be positive while at the same time cognitive worth is negative, and *vice versa*. I may continue to like a certain picture that my newly acquired esthetic taste condemns. I may heartily dislike music that I know and recognize to be "good." The confusion of these writers is due to an uncritical identification of *two distinct types of interest*.

In the moral and esthetic spheres, recognition of worth and liking for the object or act esteemed have too often been identified by philosophers. In the case of ethics, the moral conflict that often occurs between what I like and what I recognize to be best would seem to be sufficient empirical evidence to destroy this notion. Knowledge and virtue and pleasure would go hand in hand if an ideal of harmonious functioning were stipulated and attained, but practically I may reflect with little pleasure upon an act to which I ascribe great moral worth. Again, Dewey's discussion of "valuations" that are not final until I have performed an act in consequence of a preliminary judgment goes to prove that not only reflection, but also practical activities may contribute to the modification of worths previously ascribed, but it does not imply that my liking has changed gradually in the process in the positive direction. That may or may not be the case. To claim that the recognition of moral worth is the same as the felt value of moral worth is to dis-

regard the experience of moral conflict. And if it is true that certain ethical systems base their standards of moral worth on felt pleasure, it is also true that other systems are equally well able to entertain the notion of moral worth that becomes pleasurable only after the natural affections have been suppressed in its favor.

In his definition of the esthetic experience, Mr. Prall gives an unconscious illustration of this distinction. He says,<sup>18</sup> "We may value for itself the good act which expresses the good will; but the more completely we value it in itself, the more completely do we simply dwell upon it in contemplation, give ourselves over to it as total object, lose ourselves in it. And what we are *interested* in in this complete way, in pure contemplation, *in disinterested attentiveness*, is what we call the esthetically valuable" (italics mine). It may be said fairly that an interest which may be described as "disinterested attentiveness" is quite other than the interest of which we speak when we discuss affective relations.

(2) *Value-Judgments and Worth*.—The distinction between immediate value and worth rests on empirical grounds. But we have still to show that the experience of worth does not *in itself* contain an element of feeling. Undoubtedly, there are affective elements present at the time one has the worth-experience. The question is whether the worth-experience itself is partly constituted by feeling, or whether it is wholly cognitive (in the same sense as we say that to know is not to feel, although we must do both at each conscious moment). Any writer who confuses affective with cognitive interest is likely to define the experience of worth partly in terms of feeling, partly in those of cognition, if, indeed, he does not restrict both value and worth to the affective factor. Dewey and Urban both describe classes of worths that are neither wholly cognitive nor wholly affective. I shall content myself here with a criticism of Mr. Urban's position, that being the more extreme.

Value-judgments may or may not imply the recognition of standards of worth. One class of value-judgments contains no implication of worth. "I like smoking" may serve merely to bring to conscious attention a fact of affective value. No question need be raised as to the worth of smoking, because none is raised. But once that I do raise such a question, it becomes of importance to investigate the nature of the worth that is affirmed. If Mr. Urban would accept this standpoint, he might contribute much toward our knowledge of worth-affirmation. He would argue, I believe, that the objective nature of worth lies in the form rather than in the matter of affirmation. Value-judgments do not guarantee any particular

<sup>18</sup> Prall, p. 266.

worths, such as happiness or goodness, but they all have a common form, and this form is of the nature of a category of judgment. But let us see how Mr. Urban leads up to his theory of value-judgment.

After rejecting definitions of value in relational or qualitative terms, Mr. Urban investigated the possibilities latent in the substantial form of expression of values. Often we say, "This is a worth." One who still clings to the relational form of definition can readily explain this usage by calling attention to the fact that we frequently use single words to designate relations. "James shows backwardness in his studies" means that James has other boys ahead of him. But Mr. Urban believes that it is not only possible to use value in substantial fashion, but that the notion of value can be rendered adequately only in the proposition "that *A* ought to be on its own account," and he concludes that value is an objective, so far as it is amenable to expression in language.<sup>19</sup> More explicitly, the value-judgment involves, in addition to the judgment itself, "*an essential form of interest and volition as such.*"<sup>20</sup>

Limitation of space prohibits me from entering in detail into the *minutiae* of the controversy between Urban and Fisher over the possibility of conceiving value as an objective in Meinong's sense. Fortunately for my purpose, such discussion will not be required. It will be sufficient to show that the alleged typical value-judgment imports a special connotation into the term "intrinsic worth," and then to show that any expression of worth in judgment conforms to a type that I shall make clear.

Mr. Urban, as against Fisher, holds that *oughtness* in the value-judgment is quite distinct from obligation, and that the latter is a special case of the former. In his reply to Fisher,<sup>21</sup> he refers to his previous argument.<sup>22</sup> As I think, he made two points. (1) "Nor have I space to rehearse how, after showing that intrinsic value is ultimately indefinable in terms either of quality or relation, it can be finally stated only as equivalent to 'ought to be.' My critic does not even refer to these arguments, much less meet them." (2) "Of many things we can say that they ought to be; when it would be wholly absurd to think that this notion involved a command to any person or group of persons." Now since I have admitted that worth involves something more than affective-relational value, and since I believe that an adequate definition of worth can be attained in some other way than through the "typical value-judgment," the first point may await the sequel. But I would join with Fisher in denying that

<sup>19</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 462.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 677.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 398.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 462.

*ought* is ever used (except by Mr. Urban) without the notion of obligation. Mr. Urban says,<sup>23</sup> "Is it not sufficient to recall again that we often say that things ought to have been otherwise when we have not the slightest intention of ascribing obligation to them?" This, however, was hardly Fisher's point. The latter argued that *ought* involves always the notion of obligation of a person or group of persons, not of the things concerned. One wishes that Mr. Urban had given concrete examples. He shows<sup>24</sup> correctly that Perry's criticism does not touch the point because his illustrations are ill-chosen. Perhaps the following examples will suffice: "The *Lusitania* ought not to have been sunk." Here it is stated that an event should not have taken place. Is there not, however, in the mind of the speaker the notion of moral obligation unfulfilled by those who were responsible for sinking the ship? "John ought to have been happy, for he was a good man, but circumstances were against him." Does not this imply that some beneficent Power should have arranged circumstances otherwise? I can not protest too strongly against the practise of making the judgment of *moral* worth typical of *all* intrinsic worth.

In his review<sup>25</sup> of my book, Mr. Urban says that I deny that there are judgments of intrinsic value. I presume that "of" is here the sign of an objective genitive, and that he means that I deny that judgment is the means whereby intrinsic values are apprehended. From what I have said, it will be obvious that I am now engaged in proving that worth, as distinguished from immediate value, is brought into being by reflection, and that intrinsic worth therefore *is* affirmed in judgment. My book did not treat of worth-judgments from this point of view. To be clear, let me mention briefly some of the values that are associated with a judgment of intrinsic worth.

"Goodness is valuable in itself." First, there is the contributory value of the *act* of judgment, this particular judgment, like all judgments, being a means to the end of self-expression. Secondly, there is the value of the *content* of the judgment for the one who judges, which varies according to the range of application to practical activities—here the range is wide. This is also contributory in character. Thirdly, there is the value that springs from my liking or disliking the object judged (goodness). This is value of the immediate type. With these values I was chiefly concerned in the constructive portion of my book. Finally, there is the affirmation of the worth of goodness, which I should rate as a type distinct from either immediate or con-

<sup>23</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XV, p. 398.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 401.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. XIX, pp. 53-55.

tributory value, but which is more nearly allied formally to contributory value than to immediate.

Mr. Urban believes that I use the term "contributory value" equivocally, now as signifying a means to an end, now in the meaning of "adding to the functioning of conscious activity." I have guarded, however, against such an equivocation. The sense in which all judgments are contributory because they add to the functioning of conscious activity is, as Mr. Urban fails to note, from the standpoint of an observer. Now while the judging individual is not himself making a judgment about intrinsic worth as additive to conscious activity, an observer who looks upon the activity of the individual must regard all judgments, nay, every instance of conscious functioning, as a means to the end of modifying in some way the contact of the individual with his environment.

Here I wish to go further than I did in my book and maintain that judgments of worth fall into a form common to them and to all contributory values. And I shall take care to exhibit this fact in its naturalness, rather than to "force" these judgments, "in pragmatic fashion, into the instrumental mold."

To begin with, worth is not fully expressed in such a judgment as "*A* has worth." We ask what kind of worth it has. Is it a means to an end? Then it will be of contributory value. Or is it worthy in itself? Then it has intrinsic worth. Observe that Mr. Urban's typical value-judgment contains the words "on its own account." Some such expression is needed to clear the meaning, to distinguish worth that is contributory from worth that is intrinsic. Now I find a common structure and a common element in judgments of both contributory and intrinsic worth. The common element is a point of reference of the worth to some object or act. In the case of contributory value, *A* is worthy as a means to an end. In the case of intrinsic worth, however, the worth of *A* is *referred back to itself*, and description of the worth is incomplete until this backward reference is made. On the basis of these considerations, it would be allowable to treat all worth as *referential*, and to discuss two types of worth, of which the *differentia* is the point of reference.

Nor only do all worth-judgments exhibit a common referential characteristic; they also exhibit a common structure. I find this structure most conveniently described as that of a triadic relation. In this way it may be distinguished from the structure of immediate value which is dyadic—the terms here being *individual* and *object* or *act*. A worth-relation has three terms: *individual*, the *object* or *act judged*, and the *object* or *act* to which the judged object is referred.

From these considerations, based upon empirical evidence and an analysis of judgments of worth, I hope to have established (1) the distinct natures of immediate value and intrinsic worth, (2) the psychological basis in cognition of all kinds of worth, (3) the adequacy of relational definitions of both value and worth, one as dyadic, the other as triadic, (4) the common form of judgments of contributory value and judgments of intrinsic worth.

I have not space to discuss in detail Mr. Urban's interesting metaphysical speculations. I would, however, instance a most unwarranted assumption that he makes. He says,<sup>26</sup> "*That a specific object has positive or negative value, as the case may be, and why it has value, are matters of interest, feeling, and desire; but that it must fall somewhere in the scale of value, this is an essential form of interest and volition as such*, logically prior to any experience of desire or feeling. Over against the world of mere objects as such are the categories of being and value, all-inclusive forms of the world." Why "of the world"? Surely, only on an assumption of the truth of idealism. As an epistemological dualist I am constrained to remark that the category of value may only be inferred to be a category or form of the judgment-process; whether or not it extends beyond the given to the world will depend upon what kind of a world we have.

I believe that I have replied to most of Mr. Urban's criticisms. It is strange, however, to read that I "describe myself as a Pragmatist with certain reservations." The agreement with pragmatism expressed in my book was restricted to one point of method. I mention this more personal matter because it affords an instance of the danger of affixing labels to philosophical standpoints which recognize that truth is not the prerogative of any single sect of philosophical opinion.

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## MIND IN THE MECHANICAL ORDER

IF I have properly understood the intent of the article on "Pragmatism and the New Materialism,"<sup>1</sup> Professor Lovejoy's criticism is directed not altogether against pragmatism and behaviorism as such, but rather in part at least against certain philosophies which, having on some points misunderstood the meaning of these movements, have yet taken on their insignia and ended by deforming the spirit of their thought. While it is not always easy

<sup>26</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 677.

<sup>1</sup> This JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, no. 1.